United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Jeremy M., a Minor by and Through His Parent and Next Friend, L.M.

CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL DISTRICT and BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL

HEALTH/MENTAL RETARDATION

No. CIV. A. 99-4954.

Jan. 31, 2001.

Philip Matthew Stinson, Sr., Stinson Law Associates, P.C., Bryn Mawr, for Jeremy M., A Minor by and Through His Parents and Next Friends, L.M., Plaintiffs.

Joanne D. Sommer, Eastburn & Gray, Grace M. Deon, Eastburn & Gray, P.C., Thomas F.J. Mac Aniff, Eastburn and Gray, Doylestown, Robert O. Baldi, New Hope, for Central Bucks County School District, Bucks County Department of Mental Health/Mental Retardation, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KAUFFMAN, J.

*1 Minor Plaintiff, Jeremy M., by and through his parent and next friend, L.M., has brought this action seeking attorneys' fees as a prevailing party pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Bucks County Department of Mental Health/Mental Retardation ("Bucks MH/MR"), with regard to the Cross-claim brought against it by Defendant Central Bucks School District ("CBSD"). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Jeremy M., currently age 16, is an exceptional student with learning disabilities and emotional problems. He presently resides at Woods Services in Langhorne, Pennsylvania, a residential treatment facility at which he receives educational services and treatment for his various disabilities under an Individualized Education Plan agreed upon by the Defendant CBSD and his parent and paid for by both Defendants. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 7 and 21.) Plaintiff alleges that in May 1999, Woods Services, together with Defendants, sought to discharge Jeremy M. from their facility because they believed that he was abusing inhalants. (Am. Comp. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff's parent and counsel requested an expedited Special Education Due Process Hearing from the Pennsylvania Right to Education Office, pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). (Am. Compl. at ¶ 10.) At the hearing, held on July 8, 1999, Defendants agreed to rescind the discharge. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff then requested that CBSD pay his attorneys' fees incurred as a prevailing party pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). CBSD refused the request and Plaintiff filed this suit on October 6, 1999. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 22, 2000. Defendant CBSD answered the Amended Complaint on April 7, 2000 and asserted a Cross-claim against Bucks MH/MR for indemnity and/or contribution. Bucks MH/MR then filed this Motion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Motion to Dismiss

Bucks MH/MR has moved to dismiss the Cross-claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ .P. 12(b)(6). For purposes of this review, the Court must "take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the [Cross-claim] as true," construe those facts in the light most favorable to CBSD, and "ascertain whether they state a claim on which relief could be granted." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). The Court may dismiss the Cross-claim only if " 'it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." ' H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249- 50 (1989) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).

Plaintiff has asked this Court for an award of attorneys' fees from both CBSD and Bucks MH/MR pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) which provides that: "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." In its Cross-claim, CBSD asks that, if it is found liable for Plaintiff's attorneys' fees, Bucks MH/MR be required to pay all or a portion of the fees it pays to Plaintiff by way of indemnity and/or contribution.

*2 In support of its Cross-claim, CBSD alleges that the attempt to discharge Jeremy M. from Woods Services was caused by the conduct of Bucks MH/MR and not by any action on its part. (Crosscl. at ¶ 2.) CBSD is responsible only for Jeremy M.'s educational placement. (Crosscl. at ¶ 3.) Bucks MH/MR is the agency financially responsible for Jeremy M.'s residential placement. (Crosscl. at ¶ 7.) Woods Services sought only to discharge Jeremy M. from the residential part of his placement. (Crosscl. at ¶¶ 3 and 6.) CBSD neither issued the discharge nor rescinded it, and Jeremy M.'s education placement was never at issue prior to or after the expedited hearing. (Crosscl. at ¶¶ 4 and 6.) CBSD claims, therefore, that if it is deemed to be liable for Plaintiff's attorneys' fees, those fees were incurred because of the actions and/or inactions of Bucks MH/MR and, to the extent that Plaintiff is a prevailing party, he prevailed against Bucks MH/MR, not CBSD. (Crosscl. at ¶¶ 5 and 7.)

CBSD has sufficiently pleaded its Cross-claim against Bucks MH/MR. Where more than one party has failed to comply with the IDEA, the Court may apportion the prevailing party's attorneys' fees according to the relative fault of each Defendant. Barbara Z. v. Obradovich, 937 F. Suppp. 710, 720-21 (N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that a school district may assert a claim for contribution against another state agency to recover funds paid to reimburse parents for litigation costs that they incurred as a prevailing party in an administrative hearing). In this case, CBSD has pleaded that Bucks MH/MR was responsible for Jeremy M.'s residential placement and that Bucks MH/MR was one of the parties responsible for the attempt to discharge Jeremy M. from his residential placement. Construing those facts in favor of CBSD, they state a cross-claim upon which relief could be granted.

B. The Motion for More Specific Pleading

Bucks MH/MR has moved, in the alternative, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e), for an Order requiring Plaintiff and CBSD to allege specific facts to support their claims against it. A motion for a more specific pleading should be granted only when "a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Motions pursuant to Rule 12(e) are subject to a stringent standard:

"With the exception of allegations of fraud and mistake, there is no requirement in the rules that pleading be particular." 2A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice P 12.18[1] at 12-161 (1995).... The motion is appropriate when the pleading is "so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice to himself." Id. (citing Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F.Supp. 949, 954 (E.D.Pa.1994)). "The basis for granting such a motion is unintelligibility, not lack of detail. As long as the defendant is able to respond, even if only with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice, the complaint is deemed sufficient for purposes of Rule 12(e)." Wood, 708 F.Supp. at 691.

*3 Sun Co. v. Badger Design Constructors, Inc., 939 F.Supp. 365, 374 (E.D.Pa.1996).

Bucks MH/MR erroneously claims that both the Amended Complaint and the Cross- claim are insufficiently specific because there are no allegations in either pleading that it is responsible for funding Jeremy M.'s residential placement, that it funded that placement, or that it refused to fund that placement. The Amended Complaint alleges that Bucks MH/MR is a financially responsible public agency as to Jeremy M.'s schooling pursuant to the IDEA and that it sought his discharge from Woods Services. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 5 and 8.) The Amended Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees as a prevailing party because, as a result of the Due Process Hearing, Defendants "finally agreed to rescind their discharge demand...." (Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 14, 19 and 21.) CBSD's Cross-claim alleges that Bucks MH/MR is the agency financially responsible for Jeremy M.'s residential placement and that it caused the attempted discharge. (Crosscl. at ¶¶ 2 and 7.) The claims brought against Bucks MH/MR in both the Amended Complaint and the Cross-claim are, therefore, pleaded with sufficient specificity that Bucks MH/MR can respond to those allegations in good faith.

III. CONCLUSION

CBSD has sufficiently pleaded a Cross-claim against Bucks MH/MR for contribution or indemnity in the event that CBSD is ultimately found to be liable to Plaintiff for attorneys' fees pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Accordingly, Bucks MH/MR's Motion will be denied. An order follows.

ORDER

AND NOW this 30th day of January, 2001, upon consideration of Defendant Bucks County Department of Mental Health/Mental Retardation's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 19) and Defendant Central Bucks School District's response thereto, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.

END OF DOCUMENT